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Abstract: We study the effects of carbon tax and revenue recycling across the 
income distribution in the Republic of Ireland. In absolute terms, a carbon tax of 
€20/tCO2 would cost the poorest households less than €3/week and the richest 
households more than €4/week. A carbon tax is regressive, therefore. However, 
if the tax revenue is used to increase social benefits and tax credits, households 
across the income distribution can be made better off without exhausting the total 
carbon tax revenue. 
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 The Distributional Implications of a Carbon Tax in Ireland 
 
1. Introduction 
Climate policy necessarily increases the price of energy, either explicitly through taxes or 
tradable permits or implicitly by mandating the use of different fuels from those that a 
free market would choose. As energy is a necessary good, climate policy is regressive: it 
will disproportionally harm poorer households.1 Therefore, there should be additional 
policy reform to offset the negative effects of climate policy on the distribution of 
income. This paper investigates this issue for a carbon tax and revenue recycling for the 
Republic of Ireland. 
The Programme for Government 2007-2012 states that “[a]ppropriate fiscal instruments, 
including a carbon levy, will be phased in on a revenue-neutral basis over the lifetime of 
this Government.”2 Details of the carbon tax will not be decided before late 2009, but it 
seems likely that the carbon tax would be levied on carbon dioxide emissions that are not 
already regulated by the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), and that 
the tax would be roughly equal to the expected permit price in the EU ETS. We will work 
on these assumptions. 
In contrast to other policy instruments, a carbon tax has the distinct advantage that it 
generates tax revenue that can be used to even out undesired side-effects of greenhouse 
gas emission reduction. The purchasing power of households can be targeted through 
income taxes and, as the negative effects of a carbon tax are concentrated in the lower 
income groups, social welfare payments. This is essential for the political acceptability of 
a carbon tax. The previous attempt to introduce such a tax in Ireland was abandoned (in 
2004) at least partly due to distributional concerns.3 
This paper is not the first to look at these issues, as shown by the literature review in 
Section 2. However, there are only a few papers, and none on Ireland using recent data. 
As each country is idiosyncratic in its taxes and benefits, this paper does add useful 
information. Section 3 discusses the distributional implications of a carbon tax, using data 
from the latest Household Budget Survey. Section 4 shows the results for income 
recycling, using a detailed model of direct taxes and transfer payments. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Previous literature 
The impact of energy and carbon taxes on household income distribution has been 
investigated in a number of studies, although almost all of them refer exclusively to 
developed economies. This is arguably the case because in developed economies “green” 
                                                 
1 At the same time, the long-term benefits of climate policy will be reaped by poorer countries. However, 




taxes have been implemented more extensively and because the consumption of CO2 
related fuels is more even across the population, which fact is at the root of the equity 
problem.4 In fact, the literature on developed economies suggests that energy and carbon 
taxes tend to be regressive, whereas for developing economies it has been concluded that 
such taxes are either neutral or progressive.5 Here follows a brief review of the literature 
on developed economies, with a focus on the studies that concern Ireland. 
Among the earliest works is one by Poterba (1991), who analyses the distributional effect 
of a gasoline tax in the US. Using the data from the US Consumer’s Expenditure Survey, 
Poterba (1991) calculates the fractions of household income and expenditure that are 
devoted to gasoline purchase.6 He finds that the tax is only slightly regressive, especially 
when expressed as a share of expenditure. On the other hand, Safirova et al. (2004) find 
that the burden of congestion falls disproportionally on the rich (in and around 
Washington, DC), so that road pricing or fuel taxation would be strongly regressive. 
With a view to the project of a European carbon tax, Pearson and Smith (1991) estimate 
the distributional impact of the tax in seven European countries, namely France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, the UK and Ireland. Augmenting Poterba’s approach 
by including price elasticities (although they do not estimate any demand system), they 
find that in the first five countries the tax would be weakly regressive, whereas it would 
be significantly regressive in the UK and strongly regressive in Ireland. By means of a 
substantially more comprehensive model (the E3ME model, a sectoral, regionalized, 
econometric model of the EU), Barker and Köhler (1998) upgrade Pearson and Smith’s 
work and draw similar conclusions,7 although they also point out that the outcome would 
be progressive if the yield were recycled as lump-sum transfers. 
A study for Canada was conducted by Hamilton and Cameron (1994), who use an input-
output model of the economy to translate the carbon tax into all consumer prices and then 
apply Statistics Canada’s micro-simulation model to assess the distributional impact of 
the price increases.8 The simulated tax turns out to be moderately regressive. Similarly, 
Cornwell and Creedy (1996) investigate the distributional impact of a carbon tax in 
Australia. Again, the approach adopted is a combination of input-output analysis and 
estimation of the demand response of consumers, in this case based on the Australian 
Household Expenditure Survey. Cornwell and Creedy (1996) find that “The carbon tax 
                                                 
4 The difference between developed and developing countries can be explained not only by the difference 
in household expenditure patterns: Shah and Larsen (1992) argue that “[in developing countries] factors 
such as market power, price controls, import quotas, rationed foreign exchange, the presence of black 
markets, tax evasion, and urban-rural migration, may cast doubt on the regressivity of environmental 
policies” (p.8). 
5 Boyce et al. (2005) find, however, that the burden of a carbon tax in China would be borne more by rural 
households than urban ones. A study worthy of mention, especially for its innovative approach, is the one 
by Yusuf and Resosudarmo (2007) on the distributional effects of a carbon tax in Indonesia.  
6 The implicit assumptions in this approach are that a) the tax is fully translated into the price of the fuel, 
and b) the price elasticities of demands for fuels are zero. In addition, the supply side of the economy is not 
considered. Thus, this method is suited for the analysis of the so-called first-round effects. 
7 “The most regressive impact is on West Germany, the UK and Ireland, although the impact is weak” 
(p.400). 
8 Actually, as the first step they determine the tax level that would bring about a given CO2 emissions cut. 
This is calculated by means of a Computational General Equilibrium (CGE) model of the Canadian 
economy.   
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involves an increase in total tax revenue and a reduction in the degree of progressivity, 
with an increase in inequality” (p.35). 
More studies have been conducted with reference to European economies. Labandeira 
and Labeaga (1999) explore the effect of a carbon tax on Spanish household income. The 
authors use an input-output demand model to calculate the price changes induced by the 
tax, and then simulate consumers’ response via an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) 
estimated with the data from the Spanish Household Expenditure Survey. In contrast with 
other studies (in addition to those previously mentioned, see Symons et al. [2000]), they 
do not find that a carbon tax in Spain would be regressive. 
Tiezzi (2001) simulates the welfare effects of the carbon tax implemented (de facto only 
for one year) in Italy in 1999. Such effects are calculated using True Cost of Living 
indices and compensating variation; the parameters are obtained by estimating an AIDS 
with household consumption data. Surprisingly, Tiezzi (2001) finds that the Italian 
carbon tax is not regressive, but explains that this might be due to the fact that the tax 
mainly hits transport fuels because of the way it has been conceived. Indeed, in 
developed economies the pattern of household spending on transport fuels typically 
increases with income, as opposed to that of heating fuels, which is relatively flat instead. 
Brannlund and Nordstrom (2004) analyse consumer response and welfare effects due to 
changes in energy or environmental policy in Sweden, where a carbon tax has existed 
since 1991. Thus, the authors are able to estimate an econometric model for the demand 
of non-durables (a quadratic AIDS). They then assume a doubling of the Swedish carbon 
tax and compare the outcomes of two alternative recycling options, namely a lower 
general VAT and a lower VAT on public transport (equivalent to a subsidy to public 
transport). Both reforms are found to be regressive, although the second one also has a 
regional distributional effect, in the sense that households living in less populated areas 
would carry a larger share of the tax burden. 
Wier et al. (2005) assess the distributional impact of the Danish carbon tax. The method 
is standard, as it combines an input-output model and national consumer survey, but the 
data nicely “incorporate” the substitution effects, since the tax was introduced in 1992. 
The tax is found to be regressive, particularly to the disadvantage of rural households. 
Van Heerden et al. (2006) is probably the most advanced study, using a detailed 
computable general equilibrium model with multiple households for South Africa. The 
authors compute the marginal excess burden by income class, and find a triple dividend 
for selected ecological tax reforms: certain mixes of increased energy taxes and reduced 
food taxes reduce emissions, increase economic output, and reduce the income gap 
between rich and poor. 
Finally, one relatively recent study has been devoted to Ireland,9 where the tax has been 
on the government’s agenda for a few years. Using the data from the Irish Household 
Budget Survey, Scott and Eakins (2004) derive the pattern of household consumption of 
                                                 
9 For a comprehensive macroeconomic analysis of an Irish carbon tax, see Bergin et al. (2004). Also, one 
may want to consult the earlier work by Fitz Gerald and McCoy (1992), inspired by the project (never 
realised) of a European carbon tax.  
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CO2-related fuels and calculate the distributional impact of a €20 tax per ton of carbon.10 
The result is that the tax before compensation would be markedly regressive11 because 
consumption of heating fuels is almost the same across the household income 
distribution. The compensation strategies explored overcame this except for certain 
households that were difficult to target, where other means were suggested including 
promising energy efficiency retrofits (Healy 2003; Clinch and Healy, 2000). 
In this study we use more recent data than do Scott and Eakins (2004). We use a simpler 
method for estimating the impact of the carbon tax – we ignore demand effects and 
indirect impacts. However, we pay explicit attention to the distributional impacts of tax 
recycling. 
 
3. The impact of a carbon tax on income distribution 
A carbon tax is a tax on energy use, that is, a tax on a necessary good. One would expect 
that a carbon tax would be regressive. Figure 1 shows that this is the case for a carbon tax 
of €20/tCO2. A carbon tax would thus further skew the income distribution. 
The data in Figure 1 are based on the Household Budget Survey 2004-5 (CSO, 2007), 
using the micro-data on quantities of energy used for home heating, quantities of 
electricity used, and expenditures on motor fuels.12 Price data and emissions coefficients 
are taken from SEI13 and Scott and Eakins (2004). Note that we include direct emissions 
only. Indirect effects – for example, retailers passing on their carbon taxes to consumers – 
are not included. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 shows that the richest households emit only 37% more carbon dioxide than do 
the poorest households – while the equivalised disposable income14 of the richest 
households is eight times that of the poorest. It also shows that electricity, already 
regulated under the EU ETS, is only a small part of the total burden of climate policy.15 
Electricity use is rather flat across the income distribution: The top decile use only 26% 
more electricity than do the bottom decile. The distribution of “other energy”, mostly for 
                                                 
10 No input-output model of the Irish economy is used. This means that the “indirect” effect of the tax, 
which operates through the price changes of all goods other than fuels, is not captured. 
11 Results broadly similar to those in Fitz Gerald and McCoy (1992) were found. A household in the first 
income decile would pay a tax that corresponds to roughly 3% of its disposable income, while for one in 
the tenth decile the figure would be 0.5%. 
12 Note that we do not have data by income decile on fuel used in international travel, but it seems likely 
that aviation emissions will be regulated under the EU ETS in the future which will raise the price of air 
travel. 
13 Prices are from http://www.sei.ie/index.asp?locID=1017&docID=-1; emission factors are derived from 
data in SEI’s online publications Energy in Ireland, Comparison of Energy Costs for Domestic Fuels: 
Explanatory and Guidance Notes and Energy Map. 
14 Households differ in size across the income distribution. The distribution of simple household income 
therefore gives a distorted picture. Equivalisation corrects for that by expressing the household income as 
income per adult equivalent, and re-ranking the households. All figures of deciles are here formulated on 
this basis. 
15 The EU ETS has raised the price of electricity since 2007. This has been included in the relevant price 
indices that are used for setting benefits and in wage negotiations. We will therefore not consider it further. 
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home heating, is even flatter: The top decile use 8% more than the bottom. O’Doherty et 
al. (2008) show that energy saving behaviour is more common at the top end on the 
income distribution. The big difference between income deciles is in motor fuels: The top 
decile use 132% more than the bottom one. 
Figure 2 splits the implications of the carbon tax for rural and urban households. Because 
in the countryside houses are bigger, distances are longer and more transport is by car, 
rural households tend to use more energy and more (carbon-intensive) solid fuels than 
urban households in the same income decile. Therefore, a carbon tax would weigh more 
heavily on rural households. Note that the absolute difference is small: less than one euro 
per household per week in the lower income deciles. Note also that the Irish tax and 
benefit system does not distinguish between rural and urban households. Rural 
households can therefore not be compensated straightforwardly. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 3 shows the carbon tax per person and per household, as a function of household 
size and Figure 4 repeats this for each household type. Energy is a common good within a 
household. This is obvious for space heating, but it also, to a lesser extent, for transport. 
Children add somewhat to the energy use of a household, but relatively little.16 Therefore, 
a carbon tax would hit people in a smaller household harder – but the absolute differences 
between households are small. 
[Insert Figure 3 and Figure 4 about here] 
Figure 5 shows the carbon tax relative to the total benefits received and the total direct 
taxes paid (before revenue recycling; all data for 2005). The crucial insight in  this chart 
is that the carbon tax is measured in euros per week, while benefits and taxes are 
measured in hundreds of euros per week. For the bottom four deciles of the income 
distribution, the carbon tax is at most 2.0% of total benefits. For the top four deciles, the 
carbon tax is at most 2.6% of total direct taxes. Therefore, one can compensate for the 
impact of a carbon tax with a relatively small increase in benefits, and a relatively small 
decrease in income taxes.17 
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
 
4. The impact of revenue recycling on income distribution 
We use the SWITCH model (Callan et al., 2008) to study the distributional implications 
of revenue recycling. SWITCH is a model of direct taxes and welfare payments. It is 
based on the CSO’s Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC, CSO, 2006) 
This nationally representative survey captures the variability in the household population 
across such dimensions as age, household composition, income, employment, and 
disability. Results are grossed up to provide information on incomes, taxes and benefits 
                                                 
16 The difference between the average married couple with two children and three children is due to 
income. Richer families tend to be larger. 
17 In the middle parts of the income distribution, people would benefit from both higher benefits and lower 
taxes. 
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that represents the national situation. SWITCH is regularly used by the Department of 
Finance for distributional analysis of the impact of the annual budget.  
Income taxes in Ireland are relatively straightforward. A 20% tax is paid on income 
below €35,400 per year. Above that, a tax of 41% is paid. There is a standard tax credit of 
€3,660, so that the first €18,300 earned is essentially tax-free. There are additional tax 
credits for mortgage and rent, for family circumstances, and for disabilities. The Irish 
benefit system is considerably more complex, with income supplements, child benefits, 
maternity and homemaker benefits, carers benefits, illness and disability benefits, 
jobseeker and training benefits, pre-retirement allowances and pensions; many of these 
benefits come in both an entitlement and a means-tested mode. 
Using the SWITCH model, we increased social welfare payments, and decreased taxes. 
The social welfare package would involve a €2 increase per week in personal rates for all 
social welfare payments (pensions, unemployment compensation, short-term illness and 
long-term disability, one parent families). The qualified adult allowance (QAA), which 
covers spouses without an independent income, is also increased by €2 per week. 
Optionally, a further €0.80 per week is allowed in respect of each qualifying child of a 
social welfare recipient. For income taxes, we consider two scenarios. In the first, the 
basic personal tax credit is increased by €104 per year. Tax credits for one-parent families 
are adjusted in line with this. In the context of compensation for carbon taxes, a tax credit 
increase is more suitable than a tax rate cut, as the amount of carbon tax paid by 
taxpayers is broadly constant, whereas compensation via tax rate cuts would be 
concentrated towards the top of the income distribution. Nonetheless, in the second 
scenario, we reduce the tax rate in the lower band from 20.0% to 19.5%. 
Figures 6 and 7 show the results, per income decile, of higher benefits and higher tax 
credits. The increase in social welfare payments benefits households in the lower half of 
the income distribution, and the increased tax credit benefits households in the upper half 
(Figure 6). Subtracting the carbon tax, there are gains across the income distribution18 – 
but the gains are minimal for deciles 1, 4, and 10. Figure 7 adds an increase in the 
qualified child allowance for social welfare recipients, which has clear benefits for the 
lower incomes. 
Turning to tax rates, Figures 8 and 9 show the results of higher benefits and a lower tax 
rate. Again, there are gains across the income distribution, but minimal ones for deciles 1 
and 4. Rich households gain more (Figure 8). Figure 9 adds an increase in the qualified 
child allowance for social welfare recipients. As this mainly benefits households at the 
bottom of the income distribution, the distribution of gains is more equitable. 
Note that SWITCH estimates suggest that about 35,000 households in the bottom 3 
deciles (and about 55,000 in total, all in the bottom half of the income distribution) would 
not be assisted by the tax/welfare compensation package. Some of these would be 
households with a low self-employment income, subject neither to tax nor eligible for 
social welfare payments. Figures 6-9 suggest that these households are concentrated in 
the income deciles 1 and 4. 
                                                 
18 Recall that we exclude the indirect effects of carbon taxes on the income distribution. 
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Table 1 shows the effects on the government budget. The increase in social welfare 
would cost €122 million per year, or €138 million if child benefits are raised too. An 
increase in tax credits would cost the exchequer €222 million, and a decrease in the lower 
tax rate would cost €301 million. This compares with carbon tax revenue of €551 million, 
€266 million of which would come directly from households. Overall, the tax and benefit 
reform in Figure 7 would bring €191 million net to the exchequer, and the reform of 
Figure 9 would yield €112 million net. The remaining revenue can be used for other 
purposes, for instance lowering labour costs for businesses. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper, we studied the impact of a carbon tax reform on the income distribution in 
Ireland. A carbon tax is regressive, as one would expect. This is more pronounced for 
home heating than for motor fuels. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme has the smallest 
distributional effect. The impact of a carbon tax of €20/tCO2 is small compared to pre-
existing taxes and benefits. A modest increase in welfare payments would offset the 
negative impacts of a carbon tax in the lower half of the income distribution. It is 
important that benefits for dependent children of welfare recipients are increased too. 
People in the top half of the income distribution can be compensated by a small increase 
in the tax credit or a small decrease in the base rate of the income tax. Higher tax credits 
are slightly progressive, while lower tax rates are slightly regressive. These compensation 
schemes use between 65% and 80% of the expected revenue of the carbon tax. Therefore, 
in a country like Ireland, distributional concerns need not deter the introduction of a 
carbon tax. 
These findings are in line with the results for other countries as reviewed above. A carbon 
tax is regressive, but well developed tax and benefit systems mean that this can be 
remedied. This is no surprise as developed economies differ in detail but less so in broad 
terms. Expenditures on energy are a small share of total expenditures throughout the 
OECD, and therefore an increase in the price of energy can be readily compensated – if 
the tax revenue is available, which is true for the introduction of a carbon tax but not for a 
rise in the world market price of oil. 
Further research is needed on the impact of carbon taxes on fuel poverty (Healy and 
Clinch, 1992, 1994); on the range of effects within deciles (Ekins and Dresner, 2006), the 
indirect effects of carbon taxes on income distribution; on the general equilibrium effects 
of carbon taxes on income distribution; and on the effects of carbon taxes on economic 
growth and hence income distribution. 
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Table 1: Budget implications a carbon tax reform 
Description Budget1
Carbon tax, non-ETS, €20/tCO2 +€551 mln 
   of which on households +€266 mln 
Social welfare increase, €2/person/week -€122 mln 
Child benefit increase, €0.80/child/week -€16 mln 
Tax credit increase, €104/person/year -€222 mln 
Tax rate decrease, to 19.5% -€301 mln 
Welfare + child, tax credit, carbon tax +€191 mln 
Welfare + child, tax rate, carbon tax +€112 mln 
1 In 2007, Gross National Income was €161,000 mln, while Exchequer Receipts were 
€48,000; the carbon tax would thus be 0.3% of GNI and 1.2% of government revenue. 





















Figure 1: The impact (euro per household per week) of a €20/tCO2 carbon tax per 




















Figure 2: The impact (euro per household per week) of a €20/tCO2 carbon tax per 
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Figure 3: The impact (euro per household per week) of a €20/tCO2 carbon tax per 
income decile, split between urban and rural households; non-electric energy only 
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Figure 4: The impact (euro per household per week, and euro per person per week) 
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Figure 5: The impact (euro per household per week) of a €20/tCO2 carbon tax (right 
axis), and total benefits received and total direct taxes paid (left axis) per income 

























Carbon tax Social welfare Tax credit Net effect  
Figure 6: The effect of a carbon tax, social welfare increase, and tax credit increase 

























Carbon tax Social welfare Child benefit Tax credit Net effect  
Figure 7: The effect of a carbon tax, social welfare increase, child benefit increase, 
and tax credit increase per income decile, in euro per household per week; the net 



























Carbon tax Social welfare Tax rate Net effect  
Figure 8: The effect of a carbon tax, social welfare increase, and tax rate reduction 



























Carbon tax Social welfare Child benefit Tax rate Net effect  
Figure 9: The effect of a carbon tax, social welfare increase, child benefit increase, 
and tax rate reduction per income decile, in euro per household per week; the net 




ESRI Authors/Co-authors Italicised 
   
2008 249 Measuring Material Deprivation in the Enlarged EU 
  Christopher T. Whelan, Brian Nolan and Bertrand 
Maître 
   
 248 Marginal Abatement Costs on Carbon-Dioxide 
Emissions: A Meta-Analysis 
  Onno Kuik, Luke Brander and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 247 Incorporating GHG Emission Costs in the Economic 
Appraisal of Projects Supported by State 
Development Agencies 
  Richard S.J. Tol and Seán Lyons 
   
 246 A Carton Tax for Ireland 
  Richard S.J. Tol, Tim Callan, Thomas Conefrey, 
John D. Fitz Gerald, Seán Lyons, Laura Malaguzzi 
Valeri and Susan Scott 
   
 245 Non-cash Benefits and the Distribution  of 
Economic Welfare 
  Tim Callan and Claire Keane 
   
 244 Scenarios of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from 
Aviation 
  Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 243 The Effect of the Euro on Export Patterns: 
Empirical Evidence from Industry Data 
  Gavin Murphy and Iulia Siedschlag  
   
 242 The Economic Returns to Field of Study and 
Competencies Among Higher Education Graduates 
in Ireland 
  Elish Kelly, Philip O’Connell and Emer Smyth 
   
 241 European Climate Policy and Aviation Emissions 
  Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 240 Aviation and the Environment in the Context of the 
EU-US Open Skies Agreement 
  Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 239 Yuppie Kvetch? Work-life Conflict and Social Class 
in Western Europe 
21 
  Frances McGinnity and Emma Calvert 
   
 238 Immigrants and Welfare Programmes: Exploring 
the Interactions between Immigrant 
Characteristics, Immigrant Welfare Dependence 
and Welfare Policy 
  Alan Barrett and Yvonne McCarthy 
   
 237 How Local is Hospital Treatment? An Exploratory 
Analysis of Public/Private Variation in Location of 
Treatment in Irish Acute Public Hospitals  
  Jacqueline O’Reilly and Miriam M. Wiley 
   
 236 The Immigrant Earnings Disadvantage Across the 
Earnings and Skills Distributions: The Case of 
Immigrants from the EU’s New Member States in 
Ireland 
  Alan Barrett, Seamus McGuinness and Martin 
O’Brien 
   
 235 Europeanisation of Inequality and European 
Reference Groups 
  Christopher T. Whelan and Bertrand Maître 
   
 234 Managing Capital Flows: Experiences from Central 
and Eastern Europe 
  Jürgen von Hagen and Iulia Siedschlag 
   
 233 ICT Diffusion, Innovation Systems, Globalisation 
and Regional Economic Dynamics: Theory and 
Empirical Evidence 
  Charlie Karlsson, Gunther Maier, Michaela Trippl, 
Iulia Siedschlag, Robert Owen and Gavin Murphy 
   
 232 Welfare and Competition Effects of Electricity 
Interconnection between Great Britain and Ireland 
  Laura Malaguzzi Valeri 
   
 231 Is FDI into China Crowding Out the FDI into the 
European Union? 
  Laura Resmini and Iulia Siedschlag 
   
 230 Estimating the Economic Cost of Disability in 
Ireland 
  John Cullinan, Brenda Gannon and Seán Lyons 
   
 229 Controlling the Cost of Controlling the Climate: The 
Irish Government’s Climate Change Strategy 
 22
  Colm McCarthy, Sue Scott 
   
 228 The Impact of Climate Change on the Balanced-
Growth-Equivalent: An Application of FUND 
  David Anthoff, Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 227 Changing Returns to Education During a Boom? 
The Case of Ireland 
  Seamus McGuinness, Frances McGinnity, Philip 
O’Connell 
   
 226 ‘New’ and ‘Old’ Social Risks: Life Cycle and Social 
Class Perspectives on Social Exclusion in Ireland 
  Christopher T. Whelan and Bertrand Maître 
   
 225 The Climate Preferences of Irish Tourists by 
Purpose of Travel 
  Seán Lyons, Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 224 A Hirsch Measure for the Quality of Research 
Supervision, and an Illustration with Trade 
Economists 
  Frances P. Ruane and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 223 Environmental Accounts for the Republic of 
Ireland: 1990-2005 
  Seán Lyons, Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
2007 222 Assessing Vulnerability of Selected Sectors under 
Environmental Tax Reform: The issue of pricing 
power 
  J. Fitz Gerald, M. Keeney and S. Scott 
   
 221 Climate Policy Versus Development Aid 
Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 220 Exports and Productivity – Comparable Evidence 
for 14 Countries 
  The International Study Group on Exports and 
Productivity 
   
 219 Energy-Using Appliances and Energy-Saving 
Features: Determinants of Ownership in Ireland 
  Joe O’Doherty, Seán Lyons and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 218 The Public/Private Mix in Irish Acute Public 
Hospitals: Trends and Implications 
Jacqueline O’Reilly and Miriam M. Wiley 
 23
 24
   
 217 Regret About the Timing of First Sexual 
Intercourse: The Role of Age and Context 
Richard Layte, Hannah McGee 
   
 216 Determinants of Water Connection Type and 
Ownership of Water-Using Appliances in Ireland 
Joe O’Doherty, Seán Lyons and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 215 Unemployment – Stage or Stigma? 
Being Unemployed During an Economic Boom 
Emer Smyth 
   
 214 The Value of Lost Load 
  Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 213 Adolescents’ Educational Attainment and School 
Experiences in Contemporary Ireland 
Merike Darmody, Selina McCoy, Emer Smyth 
   
 212 Acting Up or Opting Out? Truancy in Irish 
Secondary Schools 
Merike Darmody, Emer Smyth and Selina McCoy 
   
 211 Where do MNEs Expand Production: Location 
Choices of the Pharmaceutical Industry in Europe 
after 1992 
Frances P. Ruane, Xiaoheng Zhang 
   
 210 Holiday Destinations: Understanding the Travel 
Choices of Irish Tourists 
Seán Lyons, Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 209 The Effectiveness of Competition Policy and the 
Price-Cost Margin: Evidence from Panel Data 
Patrick McCloughan, Seán Lyons and William Batt 
   
 208 Tax Structure and Female Labour Market 
Participation: Evidence from Ireland 
Tim Callan, A. Van Soest, J.R. Walsh 
   
 207 Distributional Effects of Public Education Transfers 
in Seven European Countries 
Tim Callan, Tim Smeeding and Panos Tsakloglou 
 
 
 
